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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the management of the debt crisis to date, and considers
several possible alternative approaches for international cooperation in the
future. The first part of the paper briefly reviews the scope of the crisis,
and some of the reasons for its onset. Then, the paper describe the
internationally coordinated policy responses to the crisis, as well as the
conceptual underpinnings of this coordinated response. In the latter part of
the paper, some of the reasons for the incomplete success of the policyresponse
are described, and several alternative measures for the future are discussed.
The discussion emphasizes the possible merits of debt forgiveness in addition to
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I.Introduction
The LDC debt crisis has differed from other problems in the world economy
in an important and fascinating way. From the beginning of the crisis, all
leading governments have acknowledged the need for an activist and
internationally coordinated policy response. Even the ostensibly
laissez—faire Reagan Administration went swiftly into action in August 1982
when the global debt crisis exploded with Mexico's announcenent that it would
be unable to meet its international debt service obligations. Within days,
the U.S. government arranged for billions of dollars of emergency financing
for Mexico. Since then, the U.S. government has taken the lead in managing
the international response to the crisis, a response which has called for the
coordinated actions of the leading creditor governments, the debtor
governments, the international banks, and the multilateral financial
institutions.
The management of the crisis has been only a partial success. On the
positive side, the dire predictions of pessimists in 1982 have not come to
pass: the countries with the largest debts have serviced their debts and not
defaulted; the international commercial banks have remained solvent; the
international capital markets have continued to function, and indeed except
for the debtor countries, have expanded in their scope and functions; and the
world has not fallen into a default-induced depression. These favorable—2—
outcomes resulted in significant part from the actions of policymakers at key
junctures in the past five years.
On the other hand, the economic results for most of the debtor countries
has been poor. Economic development for hundreds of millions of people has
been halted or partially reversed. The long—term adequacy of the current debt
strategy therefore remains very much In doubt, despite the success to date in
avoiding a financial crisis. Contrary to the forecasts of the IKE, the
creditor governments, and the commercial banks, the debtor countries have
enjoyed neither sustained recovery nor renewed access to market lending under
the current rules of the game. In some countries, the economic situation has
become so desperate that governments have been forced into a unilateral
moratorium on debt servicing, even at the cost of a serious rupture of
international financial relations.
This mix of success and failure is related to the kind of international
policy coordination advocated and managed by the United States in recent
years. The U.S. government and the other leading creditor governments
(including the U.K., Japan, and Germany) have worried more about continued
debt servicing to the commercial banks than about the pace of economic
development in the debtor countries. By opting to use their political and
economic influence to bolster their banks' positions, the creditor governments
have been able to sustain the flow of debt payments from the debtor countries,
but often at very high economic and political costs to the debtor countries
themselves.
The policy emphasis on debt servicing to the commercial banks is not
surprising, and was certainly not inappropriate in the first couple of yearsa -
—3—
of the debt crisis. The threat of insolvency of the world's largest
ccerclal banks was the •ost serious problem raised by the debt crisis at its
inception. As shown in the data of Table 1, the LOC exposure of thelargest
U.S. commercial banks greatly exceeded 100 percent of bank capital at the end
of 1982. The same is apparently true of the largest banks in Europe and
Japan. although data on bank exposures and bank capital are notgenerally
available outside of the United States. Widespread debt repudiations could
have easily triggered a global banking crisis, and it was not unreasonable for
policymakers to fear that such a crisis could have pushed the world from a
deep recession into a deep depression.
Moreover,various analyses suggested thatif the short—term problems of
thedebtcrisis could be contained, then most of the debtor countries had the
longer—term capacity to resume debt servicing and to restore economic growth,
a viewpoint which has beenbolsteredby the continuing decline in world
Interest rates. Most of these analyses also stressed, however, the need for a
continuing flow of new capital into the debtor countries, a need which was
widely recognized by policymakers but which has not been satisfactorily
satisfied.
In the past two years. the nature of the debt .anage.ent has provoked
increasing opposition in the debtor countries, since the debtor countries have
been making large sacrifices but without renewed growth, and since spectre of
aglobalbanking crisis has lessened. Moreover, the worlSdde drop in
commodities prices since 1985worsened the economic situation in many of the
debtorcountries, as did a further drying up of bank lending. Several smaller
debtorcountries have recentlyrejectedthe international rules ofthe game,Table 1
U.S. Sank Assets in the Debtor Countries
Nine Major Banks





Latin America 51.2 53.8 52.2





Latin America 176.5 157.8 119.7
Sub—Saharan Africa 19.3 14.3 8.1
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, "Country Exposure
Lending Survey." End—1982 from statistical release of October 15,
1984; March 1986 from release of August 1, 1986. Exposures are
calculated using data for "Total amounts owedtoU.S. banks after
adjustments for guarantees and external borrowing." Total exposures
are calculated for All LDCs (OPEC, Non-Oil, Latin America, Non—Oil
Asia, Non—Oil Africa); Latin America (Non—Oil Latin America plus
Ecuador and Venezuela); and Africa (Non—Oil Africa plus Algeria.
Gabon, Libya and Nigeria).—4-
and have unilaterally restricted debt servicing, Peru being the best known
case. The threat of a breakdown In continued dtht servicing led U.S. Treasury
Secretary James Baker III to propose the "Baker Plan" In October 1985, which
called for increased inflows of private and official capital into the debtor
countries in return for Internationally supervised policy adjustments in those
countries. However, more than a year after the announcement of the Baker
Plan, there is little evidence of a renewed flow of private foreign capital
into the debtor countries.
This paper reviews the management of the debt crisis to date, and
considers several possible alternative approaches for international
cooperation in the future. Section II of the paper briefly reviews the scope
of the crisis, and some of the reasons for its onset. Section III describes
the Internationally coordinated policy responses to the crisis. Section IV
describes the conceptual underpinnings of this coordinated response, and
Section V then describes some of the reasons for the Incomplete success of the
policy response. Section VI discusses several alternative measures for the
future, Conclusions from the paper are summarized in Section VII.
II. The Scope and Origins of the LDC Debt Crisis
The basic outlines of the LOC debt crisis are by now very well known, so
that only a brief summary of the onset of the crisis will be needed here.
(Detailed accounts of the crisis can be found in several recent books,
including dine (1984), Lever (1986), Lonax (1986), Kakin (1984), and
Nunnenkamp (1986)). Spokesmen in the developing countries sometimes Insist
that the debt crisis arose solely because of global economic dislocations,—5-
while creditor country policymakers sometimes suggest that mismanagement by
the debtor countries is entirely to blame for the crisis. The truth is of
course somewhere in the middle. The fact that more than forty countries
simultaneously succumbed to crisis suggests that global factors were crucial
to the onset of the crisis. But the fact that many countries affected by
global shocks avoided a crisis (for example most of the debtor nations in East
Asia) highlights the importance of country-specific factors, often Involving
important policy mistakes, in the onset of the crisis. We turn first to the
globa! factors in the crisis, then to the mistakes of economic management in
the debtor countries themselves.
A.Global Factors in the Onset of the Crisis
After the bond defaults of the Great Depression, international commercial
lending to the developing countries virtually disappeared, until the
development of cross-border commercial bank lending in Eurodollars in the late
1960s (see Sachs (1981), Eichengreen and Portes (1986), and Fishlow (1985) for
descriptions of the ups and downs of international lending during the past
century). During the period 1950 to 1970, foreign direct Investment provided
the bulk of international private capital flows, and private capital flows as
a whole were smaller In magnitude than official flows from the multilateral
Institutions and from individual creditor governments. In the early 1970s,
private capital flows to the developing countries began to exceed official
flows, as private bank lending rose to become the dominant form of
International capital flow. The sharp rise in world liquidity during 1971-73,
related to overly expansionary U.S. monetary policies and the demise of the—6-
fixed exchan9e rate system, contributed to the expansion of the Eurodollar
market and to an increase In bank funds available for onlending to developing
-countries.Thus the rise in International bank lending predated the first
OPEC oil shock of late 1973.
Thefirst OPEC shock in 1973 dramatically increased thepaceof LDC bank
lending,as the newsavings of the Persian Gulf countries were channeledto
the international comuiercial banks, which lent (or "recycled") these savings
to the developing countries.This burst of lending was not simply the result
of oil—importing countries trying to maintain their real consumption levels
after the rise in oil prices, as is sometimes suggested.Indeed, many oil
•xoortina LDC5 outside of the Persian Gulf (i.e. countries such as Nexico and
Nigeria) borrowed substantially from the international banks, so that by 1983,
aftertheenormous rise in real oil prices during the previous decade, the
large10 developIng country debtors, asa group, were oil exporters.1
Nost ofthe international lending during this periodwasundertaken by
officialborrowers (i.e. central governments, public sector development
banks, parastatals, etc.) rather than by the private sector, though the
proportion of public and private borrowing differed by country.In many
cases, the borrowing was usedto finance ambitious public sector investment
programsthat could now be funded with readily available international banks
creditsat low real interest rates. Thestrategy of a rapid growth takeoff,
based on foreign financing of large scale public Investments, has been termed
"indebted industrialization" by Friedan (1981), who has studied the politics
of this strategy in some detail In the cases of Brazil, Korea, and Mexico.
Anideaofthe share of publicand -privateborrowingcan be gleaned from—7-
the World Bank Debt Tables, which separates public sector and publicly
guaranteed borrowing from private sector borrowing (the World Bank data refer
only to medium-and long-term debt, since the data do not provide a breakdown
of the short—term debt by kind of borrowing). For Latin America as a whole,
about three-fourths of all long—term borrowing at the end of 1978 and also at
the end of 1983 was public or publicly guaranteed. Note that this ratio might
be biased upward to some extent because debts contracted by the public sector
are probably more completely covered by the World Bank Debt Reporting Service
than are debts contracted by the private sector.
The fact that the external debt is heavily concentrated In the public
sector has had profound implications for adjustment to the debt crisis by the
debtor countries. As I stress later, these countries have two fundamental
problems to overcome. The first, and most widely recognized, Is that of
transferring national Income (via trade surpluses) to the foreign creditors.
The second problem, which is perhaps as difficult, Is that of transferring
income from the private sector of the debtor country to the Dublic sector so
that the public sector may service Its debts. In many countries, the nation
as a whole does not lack the resources to pay the forel9n creditors, but
rather the public sector is unable or unwilling to tax the private sector
sufficiently to generate an adequate debt—servicing capacity.
As of 1979 the pace of International lending did not seem to pose a
particular danger to the banks or to the world economy. Various debt
indicators, such as the popular debt-export ratio, gave very few signs of
danger. Exports from the borrowing countries were booming, so that
debt—export ratios (Table 2) actually fell between 1973 and 1980 despite theTable 2
Trade, Interest Rate, and Debt Indicators for the Developing Countries
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
(a) Interest Rates1
Nominal 8.2 11.2 13.1 18.3 14.4 9.5 11.3 9.6
Inflation 7.3 8.8 9.1 9.6 6.5 3.8 4.1 3.3
Real 0.9 2.4 4.0 8.7 7.9 5.7 7.2 6.3
(b) Trade Volumes and Values (annual change for nonfuel exporters)
Exports:
Volume 9.4 8.4 9.1 6.5 0.7 8.311.7 3.4
Price 5.517.3 13.5 —2.6 —5.9 —4.4 0.5 —3.3
Earnings15.4 27.1 23.8 3.7 —5.2 3.512.2 0.0
Imports:
Volume 8.9 9.3 6.5 1.5 —5.5 1.6 5.2 3.3
Price 9.8 18.1 20.6 2.8 —3.3 —4.6 —1.0 —2.1
Earnings19.5 29.8 28.4 4.4 —6.7 —3.1 4.2 1.1
Trade Balance
($billion)—34.8—50.1—75.0—80.2—52.7—41.9—19.9—23.7
Cc) Trade Volumes (annual change) and Trade Balance for Western Hemisphere LOCs
Export vol. 9.6 7.5 1.2 6.1 —2.2 7.1 7.3 —1.2
Import Vol. 5.5 8.0 9.3 2.6—17.7—22.2 2.9 —1.3
Trade Balance
($bIllion)—4.0 —0.8 —1.9 —3.2 7.2 28.7 37.0 33.6
1973 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
(d) Debt Indicatorsfor Non—Oil Developing Countries (ratios In percent)
Debt (SbillIon) 130.1336.3396.9474.0555.0 612.4
Debt/Exports 115.4130.2119.2112.9124.9143.3
Debt Service!
Exports 15.9 19.0 19.0 17.6 20.4 23.9




Exports 29.3 41.7 40.9 35.6 41.7 54.0
1. Nominal interest rate is a three-month U.S. interest rate. Inflation is
the annual change In the GOP deflator. The real interest rate is the nominal
rate •lnus inflation.
Source: International Nonetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, AprIl 1986.-8-
jump In total debt of the non—oil developing countries (hereafter NOLDC's)
from $130.1 billion in 1973 to $474 billion in 1980. With this happy state of
affairs, international financial specialists, academics, and policymakers
welcomed the continued "recycling" of OPEC money, and worried little about a
debt crisis.
The key to this happy state of affairs was that nominal Interest rates on
dollar loans were consistently below the rate of growth of dollar export
earnings of the borrowing countries (another way to put the same thing is that
real interest rates were consistently below the rate of growth of real export
earnings). In 1979, for example, as shown in Table 2(a) and 2(b), nominal
U.S. Interest rates averaged 11.2 percent, while the export earings of the
LDC nonfuel exporters grew by 27.1 percent. In these circumstances, a debtor
country can borrow all the money that it needs for debt servicing (i.e. all
of the interest and amortization due) without experiencing a rise in its
debt-export ratio.2
However, if nominal interest rates exceed the growth of nominal export
earnings, then a country that borrows all the money it needs for debt
servicing will experience an ever-increasing debt—export ratio.Sooner or
later, the country will be cut off from new borrowing, and it will have to pay
for its debt servicing out of its own resources, I.e. by running trade
surpluses. With nominal interest rates in the mid— to—late 1970s at 10
percent or so (see Table 2), and with LOC export earnings growing at •ore than
15 percent per year in dollar terms, debt—export ratios were easily kept under
control. Very few observers suspected that In the near future, the debtor
countries would suddenly have to shift from new borrowing to trade surpluses—9-
asthe way to meet their debt—servicing needs.
The second and devastating phase of international borrowing took place in
1980-82, after the heady and highly profitable experience of 1973-79. Almost
none of the relevant actors, neither borrowers nor lenders (nor, It should be
said, academic observers) understood quickly enough that the success of the
first period was built squarely on the temporary condition of low interest
rates and high growth In export earnings. Prudent debtors and bankers should
surely have expected that within a few years interest rates might rise to
exceed growth rates, but few could have anticipated the sudden and dramatic
turnaround in the interest rate—growth relation after 1980, which Is shown In
Figure 1 (and In the data of Table 1).
The debt crisis followed relentlessly upon the rise in interest rates and
collapse in export earnings. Once this reversal took place, all of the debt
warning signs started to fly off of the charts, as seen by the rapid Increase
In the debt-export and debt—service ratios after 1979 (Table 1). Bank
lending itself dropped off, with gross 815 bank claims on the NOLDC5 rising at
the rate of 24 percent in 1980, 18 percent in 1981, and 7 percent in 1982, but
the growth in export values declined even ore sharply, from 26 percent in
1980, to 5 percent In 1981, and —4 percent in 1982. Consequently, the
debt-exportratio rose quickly.
AsIs well known, the rise in interest rates had an especially pronounced
effectbecause of the nature of the LDCdebt tothe aaercialbanks, most of
whichwasinthe form of .edium—term(generally 3 to 7 years) rollover
credits,with interest rates at a fixed spread overa short—term reference
rate(such as the London Interbank Offered Rate, LIBOR, or theU.S.prime-s






Source: 1976—79, "non—oil" LDCs export value growth, from IMF
World Economic Outlook, June 1981; 1980-85, "non-fuel
exporter" LDCs export value growth, from the IMF World











rate). Thus, just as soon as short-term interest rates rose at the end of
1979, the interest rates charged on the existing syndicated bank loans to the
LDCs rose by the same amount. Also, since the great bulk of the debt was
dollar denominated, the rise in the dollar exchange rate (and the consequent
fall in dollar prices of internationally traded commodities) was especially
painful.
The reasons for the rise in interest rates and fall in the dollar value
of trade have been widely discussed. After the second OPEC price shock, the
leading industrial countries embarked on a widely endorsed policy of rapid
disinflation, based on very tight monetary policies which raised interest
rates around the world. No international organization, not the tHE, nor the
World Bank, nor the OECD, gave any hint at the time that the suddenness and
sharpness of the monetary tightening would be problematic. To the contrary,
international officials everywhere applauded the seriousness of purpose of the
anti—inflation fight. The rise in interest rates was particularly large in
the U.S. in 1981 and after, because in addition to tight monetary policies
there was the prospect of many years of large budget deficits caused by the
Reaganomics tax cuts of 1981. As is now well understood, the especially high
U.S. interest rates created a capital inflow into the U.S., and a sharp
appreciation of the dollar.
B.The Role of Domestic Policies in the Onset of the Crisis
Without the global shocks, the debt crisis would not have occurred.
However, in almost all countries that succumbed to an external debt crisis,
domestic policy •istakes also played an important role, a point which makes—11—
commercial bank lending (especially after 1979) harder to understand, since
the banks should have seen some of the policy disarray in these countries.
Some economies that faced severe external disturbances, such as South Korea
and Thailand, were able to surmount the shocks and maintain international
creditworthiness and growth, at least after a short interval. Other
economies, which actually could have benefitted on balance from the external
events, such as the oil—exporters Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela, collapsed
under the weight of higher world interest rates. What were the crucial
differences that led to successful adjustment in some cases but not in others?
In a recent paper (Sachs, 1985), I explored some of the possible
differences, by looking at the experiences of the Latin American and the East
Asian debtor countries. Among the major Latin American countries, all but
Colombia succumbed to a foreign debt crisis (as Indicated by the need for a
commercial bank debt rescheduling and by the exclusion from continued
borrowing on normal •arket terms), while in Asia all of the countries avoided
the need for a bank rescheduling with the exception of the Philippines.
Interestingly, the differences in experience were not fundamentally due to the
differences in the size of the external shocks hitting the two regions. As an
example, Mexico's debt crisis arose despite a nearly fourfold increase in
export earnings (due to oil) during 1978 to 1982, so that Mexico benefited
rather than suffered from the commodity price movements In the years preceding
the debt crisis. Rather, as stressed also by Balassa (1982) among others, the
orientation of trade and exchange rate policy was vital. Countries with
export—promoting trade policies were far sore successful in surmounting the
external shocks. Third, and not sufficiently stressed In the 1985 paper, the—12—
short-runpolicy responses after 1979 were vital: a quick reaction to the
change in the International environment was necessary for a successful
adjustment.
Thekeyeconomic difference in the two regions is the rapid export growth
in Asia, which kept down that region's debt—export ratios. The
export—orientation of the Asian economies, in contrast to the
import—substitution strategy in Latin Anierica, is well known and well
documented. It should be stressed that the export orientation of the Asian
countries is decidedly a matter of poF Icy choice rather than inherent
structure, since two of the leading examples of export-led growth (South Korea
and Indonesia) went through a Latin—American styled Import—substitution phase
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with the result that exports were stifled
and growth was retarded. Incredibly, South Korean exports were a mere 3
percent of GNP in 1950. compared with 37 percent of GNP in 1983. Indonesian
exports rose from 5 percent of GNP in 1965 to 23 percent of GNP in 1983!
In addition to the question of long-term policy orientation, the external
shocks imposed serious challenges for short-run policy after 1979. The rise
in world interest rates placed direct and significant pressures on government
budgets, because of the rise in debt servicing costs on both foreign and
domestic debt (domestic debt In mostcountriesexperienced a rise in interest
rates in response to the rise in world rates). It also provokedcapital
outflows and reserve losses in countries with fixed exchange rates (virtually
all of the developing countries at the time).Exportsdroppedasworld trade
slowed, and investments fell in response to higher interest rates. Thus
aggregate demandandemployment tended to fall, at the same time that deficits—13-
were rising and foreign reserves were falling. The freedom of action for both
onetary and fiscal policy was therefore extremely limited.
In Asia, budget deficits were kept under control and exchange rates were
devalued after 1979 in response to these shocks (remarkably, Indonesia took a
preventative devaluation to spur non-oil exports In 1978, In the belief that
oil exports would remain weak). Starting from a diversified export base,
these policy changes in Asia caused a fairly quick rise in the region's export
volumes. Also, both policies helped these countries to avoid the problem of
capital flight, which tends to occur in anticipation of a currency
devaluation, an anticipation which in turn is naturally raised by large budget
deficits.
In Latin America, the story Is almost the opposite. In almost all of the
countries concerned (certainly including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico,
Uruguay. and Venezuela) the exchange rate was allowed to become substantially
overvalued during 1979 to 1981, with the result that export growth in the
early 1980s was meagre. Brazil was the Important exception to the exchange
rate overvaluatlon, and It alone enjoyed an export boom between 1981 and 1984.
To the extent that the Latin American governments endeavoured to maintain
economic growth, they did so mainly through expansionary fiscal policy, which
exacerbated the budget deficits that were already bulging because of higher
interest payments on home and foreign debt. Money financing of the budget
deficits Increased in many countries, with the result of enormous capital
outflows and reserve losses during 1981 and 1982. After the reserves and
access to borrowing ran out In 1982, the continuation of money—financed
deficits led to sharp currency depreciations and an explosion of Inflation—14-
(with triple digit inflations in Argentina. Bolivia, Brazil, Peru,and now in
1986, Mexico).
The data in Table 3 showthe differencesIn real exchange rates of the
two regions (vis—a—vls the U.S.) during theyearsbuilding up to the crisis.
Therealexchange rate is measuredhereas the country's consumer price level
relative to the U.S. consumer price level, adjusted for exchange rate changes.
A value above 100 signIfies a real appreciation after 1978, Implyingthat the
country's goods and labor became relatively expensive inInternational
markets. The results of these exchange rate policies are reflected Inthe
superior export performance of the Asian economies:
Annual Chanaes in Export volumes, 1980—84
1980-84
(Avg.) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Latin America 3.9 1.2 6.1 —2.2 7.1 7.3
Asia 8.6 9.2 9.3 0.5 10.1 14.0
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic outlook 1986, p.205.
C.TheCollapse of Bank Lending in 1982
The warning signs of impending crisis were everywhere in 1981,but were
virtually Ignored. World interest rates were at historic highsand
international trade was stagnant. Several countries, Including Bolivia,
Jamaica, Peru, Poland, and Turkey were already in seriousdebt difficulties by
the endof1980. By the end of 1981. massive capital flight was occurringin
Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, as unrealistic exchangerates came under attack,
and as large domestic budget deficits (particularly In Argentinaand Mexico)
fed a rapid Increase inthemoney supply. According to oneestimate,by theTable 3
Real Exchange Rate Behavior. Selected Countries
(1978 =100)
Average
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 (1980—81)
Latin America
Argentina 100 141 179 138 59 159
Brazil 100 92 76 80 77 78
Chile 100 102 116 126 100 121
Mexico 100 106 117 127 85 122
Venezuela 100 101 108 114 118 112
East Asia
Indonesia 100 78 81 81 80 81
Malaysia 100 99 93 87 86 90
South Korea 100 105 96 94 89 95
Thailand 100 101 104 99 93 102
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
The real exchange rate is calculated as P/EP*, where P is the CPI. E is
the exchange rate in units of currency per $11.5., and P* Is the U.S. CPI.
A rise in the index signifies a currency appreciation.—15—
end of 1983, cumulative capital flight accounted for 61 percent of Argentina's.
gross external debt, 44 percent of Mexico's debt, and 77 percent of
Venezuela's debt.3
If the banks could be excused for their lending during 1973—79, It
is •uch harder to justify a veritable explosion of bank lending to Latin
America In the circumstances of 1980-82. Latin Americans by the thousands
were lining up at their local banks to take money out of their countries
during 1981 and 1982 at the same time that the commercial banks were
shovelling the money in. High ranking Mexican officials have recounted off
the record that at the end of 1981, MexIco had decided to undertake a
desperately needed devaluation, but was discouraged from doing so by a leading
New York bank, which assured the Mexican government that a large line of
credit would be available to the government to continue defend the prevailing
parity.
Thus, as shown in Table 4, the net claims of International banks on
Mexico virtually doubled In the two years between end—'79 and end-'Bl, and the
net claims more than doubled for Argentina. The combined claims on the three
large debtors, Argentina. Brazil, and Mexico, almost exactly doubled in the
two—year period, increasing by $48 billion.In Asia, only thenetclaims on
South Korea increased markedly, andthenfrom a much lower level than In Latin
America.
By early 1982, the International commercial banks began to understand the
longer—term implications of the rise inworldinterest rates and thefallIn
exportgrowth rates. Projections of debt-export ratios prepared in these new
international circumstances showed that the debt—export ratios of theTable 4














developing countries would rise rapidly in the near future unless these
countries shifted towards a trade surplus, something that was hard to imagine
at the time. Bank jitters were increased by the growing number of countries
with 'special' problems, such as Poland in 1981, and Argentina (at war In the
Falklands) in the Spring of 1982. Banks also came to appreciate the
possibility of a classic liquidity squeeze. Given the buildup of debt, and
the large share that was short term, the total debt servicing due in 1982
(including all short term debt, as well as amortizations and Interest on
medium and long—term debt), came to exceed 100 percent of exports in 1982 for
several Latin countries, though not for the Asian countries. Taking the
average debt service ratios for 1980-83 for the two regions, we see the
difference in Table 5. Thus, a cessation of new lending (including an
inability to roll over short term debts) would inevitably force the Latin
countries into a moratorium on debt servicing, even if all of exports were to
be used for that purpose!
Mexico, of course, set off the global shock In 1982. In the beginning of
1982, Mexico finally devalued Its grossly overvalued currency, but then almost
immediately lost international confidence by giving a large public sector wage
increase as compensation for the devaluation. The budget deficit remained
enormous (an estimated 17.6 percent of GD!' in 1982), meaning that even the new
pegged level would soon become unsustainable. In the spring of 1982, Mexico
canvassed the banking community for a new large international loan, but
received a cool response. International reserves fell sharply throughout the
sprIng and summer, and the Mexican public speculated against the new exchange
rate. Unable to win bank confidence under these unsettled circumstances, theTable 5











Source: Sachs, 1985, Table 4, p. 533.—17—
Mexicangovernment took several remarkable steps in August, Including: a
freezing of dollar accounts in Mexican banks, a renewed depreciation of the
currency under a new dual-rate system, an Imposition of new exchange controls,
and most Important, a declaration of a temporary suspension of debt—service
payments. Soon thereafter, in a parting shot, outgoing Mexican President
Lopez Portillo nationalized the Mexican banks.
These events of course stopped all new lending to Mexico, and the drop In
lending rapidly spread to the other debtor countries, especially in Latin
Aaerica. In quick response, more than a dozen debtor countries began
negotiationswith the banks and the official bilateral creditors on
rescheduling of debt payments for 1982 and 1983. The list of reschedulers
eventually ran up to more than forty countries.
III. The Creditor Response to the Debt Crisis
Sofarwe haveestablished, in rough terms, how the debt crisis arose.
Now weturn to theinternationalpolicy responsetothe crisis itself. The
theme of this section is that a credit crisis poses certain key and
Identifiable needs for International coordination, and that to an important
extent, such needswerefulfilled by international policy coordination. The
style of International management was set first in the Mexican bailout of
1982, to which weturnfirst.
A.The 1982 Mexican Bailout
Theevents In Mexicopromptedstrong andalmostIediate actions in
support of Mexico fromthe officialInternational financial cosunity, under-18—
the leadership of the U.S. government, especially the U.S. Treasury and the
Federal Reserve Board. Within days of Mexico's announcement of a suspension
in debt servicing, the following actions were taken: (1) the U.S. government
committed nearly $3 billion to Mexico, including $1 billion In prepayments for
oil purchases for the strategic petroleum reserve, $1 billion In finance of
agricultural exports to Mexico from the Commodity Credit Corporation, and a
$925 million bridge loan from the Federal Reserve Board; (2) the Bank for
International Settlements extended a bridge loan to Mexico of nearly $1
billion; (3) the export credit agencies of the leading creditor countries
agreed to Increase their lending to Mexico by $2 billion; and (4) talks got
underwayfor a large IMF loan. By November1982, the INF agreement was
reached,providing for $3.1 billion of lending over three years. The IMF
agreement called for budget and monetary austerity in Mexico in view of the
country'sreduced access to foreign borrowing. In the following year, Mexico
rescheduled it debts with its official creditors in the Paris Club forum.
The great novelty of the IMF agreement was to link the IMF financing to
new lending from Mexico's bank creditors. The IMF declared that it would put
new money into Mexico only if the existing bank creditors also increased their
loan exposure. The requisite agreement with the commercial banks took effect
in early 1983. The bank agreement called for a rescheduling of Mexico's
existing debts falling due between August 1982 and December 1984 (theterm of
theIMF program), as well as a new loan of $5 billion, to be extended by the
existing banks In proportion to their existing exposure. The rescheduling
provided for continued and timely payments of interest on market terms on
Mexico's existing debts, and In fact the spread over LIBOR on Mexican debt was-19-
increased in the agreement. Thus, in present value terms there was no
sacrifice made by the banks In the debt rescheduling or in the new loan,
assuming that both would continue to be serviced.
Moreover, under prevailing accounting conventions, the U.S. banks would
not have to show any loss at all under the rescheduling agreement, since what
is crucial for income accounting for the banks is the continued and timely
servicing of Interest on the loan, not principal. Indeed, the rise In spreads
on Mexico's rescheduled debts meant that the banks would report higher, not
lower, income as a result of the rescheduling operation. This concern of U.S.
bank accounting with the interest flow on bank claims, rather than with
changes in the underlying values of the claims, helps to explain the single-
minded concern In the bank agreements with a continued and timely servicing of
Interest: no Interest relief, then no loss of short—term profits.
In the discussion that follows, I will use the terms "debt relief" or
"debt forgiveness" for arrangements that reduce In present value terms the
contractual obligations on debt repayments. The term "debt rescheduling" will
be taken to imply (as In the Mexican program) a postponement of repayments,
but one that maintains the present value of contractual debt servicing
obligations.
B.Generalizing the Mexican Example
The Mexican program was rather quickly Improvised, but It nevertheless
became the norm for the dozens of reschedulings that followed. Like the
Mexican program, virtually all of the debt restructurings have had the
following characteristics:—20-
—-TheIME has made high—conditionality loans to the debtor QOvernment,
always contingent on a rescheduling agreement being reached between
the country and the commercial banks;
——Thecommercial banks have rescheduled existing claims, by stretching
out principal repayments, but without reducing the contractual
present value of repayments;
——Thedebtor countries have agreed to maintain timely servicing of
interest payments on all commercial bank loans;
——Thebanks have made their reschedulings contingent on an IMF
agreement being in place;
—-Theofficial creditors have rescheduled their claims in the Paris
Club setting, and have also made such reschedulings contingent on an
IMF agreement.
While it has been true that all bank reschedulings have preserved the
contractual present value of the banks' claims, only some of the rescheduling
agreements have involved concerted lending. The amounts involved in the
concerted lending dropped significantly in 1985, and revived only partially in
1986, entirely on the basis of a new loan to Mexico, as shown by the data of
Table 6. The fall off in concerted lending occurred not because of diminished
needs for such loans, but because the banks have strongly resisted new lending
in the past two years except in cases of when default appeared to be a
plausible alternative for the country in question (such as Mexico in 1986).









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































—-Explicitbacking for the loan by the IMF and U.S. government, often
with pressure exerted on the banks by the U.S. Treasury and the IMF
Managing Director;
—-Apro rata allocation of the new loan aong the existing banks, with
a possible proviso excluding the smallest of the bank creditors;
—- Alinkage of the bank loan to the debtor country's compliance with
an IMF agreement.
Zn addition to orchestrating the relationship between the debtor
countries and the banks, via the IMF, the creditor governments also confront
the debtor countries directly as official bilateral creditors, mainly through
export credit agencies. For the most heavily indebted countries, most
external debt (about three-fourths of the total) is owed to commercial banks
and other private creditors, but for many of the smaller debtors, especially
those with lower per capita income levels, •uch more than half of the debt has
been extended by official creditors, often at concessionalterms.4 In
general, official lending to the heavily Indebted countries did notdecline In
the years after 1982, though there is some hint in the data of a slowdown of
official bilateral lending in 1985 and after.
Official bilateral debt (but not the debt of the multilateral
institutions) is rescheduled in the Paris Club setting. Paris Club
reschedulings differ from commercial bank reschedulings in two important ways.
First, reschedulings of debt In the Paris Club often represent a fortof
forgiveness, since some of the debt in question is already set at a
concessional interest rate. Second, the Paris Club does not object as a rule
to rescheduling part or all of the interest payments due, so.ethingthat is—22—
anathema to the commercial banks. This discrepancy is consistent with the
overall strategy of the creditor country governments, which is not to maximize
debt service payments by the debtor countries, but rather to protect the
servicing of Interest on the bank debt.
The World Bank and the multilateral development banks (MOBs) are the
other major actors in the international management of the debt crisis, and
their role has been growing under pressure from the U.S. since 1985. The
World Bank has recently increased its lending to the heavily indebted
countries, with many loans now coming as part of an elaborate package
including IME, commercial bank, and creditor government loans (as in the 1986
Mexican package). The role for the World Bank is expanding under two
pressures. First, the direct lending of the IMF is somewhat constrained, as
many of the Important debtor countries are near their ceilings on drawings
from the IMF, and in fact will be net repayers to the IMF in the next three
years. Second, as the problems of the debtor countries are increasingly seen
as structural and medium term (rather than simplyreflecting a short- run
liquidity squeeze), the long-term development finance of the World Bank is
seen as increasingly relevant.
One substantive change in World Bank lending since the onset of the debt
crisis is the shift from project lending to so—called policy—based lending.
In policy-based lending, money is made available to facilitate policy changes
on a sectoral or national level, mainly involving the liberalization of
internal and external markets. In March 1986, the World Bank Executive
Directors expressed support for a rise in policy-based lending to between 15
and 20 percent of all World Bank lending during 1986-1988, up from around 10—23—
percent in the early 19805. For the heavily indebted developing countries,
policy—based lending accounted for as much as 35 percent of all lending by the
World Bank to the countries during 1986. A second substantive change in World
Bank lending is the increasing resort to cofinancing arrangements with private
sector creditors, as a way to sti.ulate new private lending via new public
lending.
The regional multilateral development banks (Asian Development Bank,
African Development Bank, Inter—*aerican Development Bank) are also attempting
to increase their lending to the heavily indebted countries in conjunction
with Increased World Bank lending. In fact, these MDBs have had great
difficulty in disbursing more loans In the past two years because 44DB lending
generally requires counterpart funding from the developing country itself,
much of which has been dropped from austerity budgets. In fact, despite the
extensive talk of increased public lending in recent years, the combined loans
of the World Bank and the multilateral development banks has grown rather
slowly since 1980. To the fifteen largest debtor countries, the net
disbursements per year hove risen from $2.1 billion in 1980 to $3.7 billion in
1985, a rather meagre Increase of $1.6 billion (see IMF International Capital
Markets, December 1986, pp. 74—81).
IV. The ConceDtual Basis of the Debt Management Strateav
An interesting aspect of the management of the debt crisis is one thing
that did happen: no leading official in the Reagan Administration or in
other leading creditor governments said that the crisis was a matter for the—24-
private markets only, with no role for the government intervention. From the
very first days of Mexico's August 1982 crisis until now, the U.S. government
has been deeply involved in managing the crisis. One reason for this
Involvement was gut fear. At the end of 1982. the LDC exposure of the nine
U.S. money center banks was $83.4 billion, or 287.7 percent of bank capital
(see Table 1). In Latin America alone, the exposure was 176.5 percent of bank
capital, and more than 70 percent of that was to Brazil and Mexico alone. It
seemed obvious that If the largest debtor countries unilaterally repudiated
their debt, then the largest U.S. banks could fail, with dire consequences
for the U.S. and world economy. The creditor governments therefore
recognized the Importance of continued debt servicing, and were willing to
provide official financing for that purpose. But the motivation for official
management of the crisis went deeper than fear, and that was the widely shared
assumption, anchored in the experience of the Great Depression, that one can't
simply "leave it to the markets" in the case of a financial crisis.
The policymakers took the view that the debt crisis reflected a short— to
medium-term liquidity squeeze, rather than a fundamental problem of solvency.
It was felt from the beginning that if the debtor countries could be nursed
along for a few years without a breakdown of the system, they would enjoy an
economic recovery and be able to resume normal debt servicing, and normal
borrowing from the international capital markets. This conclusion, which must
be tested on a country by country basis (since there are clearly some
countries were solvency Is really at stake), has been reached by a number of
analysts, including dine (1984), Cohen (1985), and Feldstein (1986).
For all of these analysts, the basic point is the sae. Since the debt—25-
of the a typicalLatin American debtorcountry stands
at about 70 percentof
GNP, the interest
charges on thatdebt represent
approximately 5—7 percentof
GWP (with an
Interest rate of 8to 10 percent peryear).
This is a heavy,but
not insurmountable
burden for a debtorcountry, particularly
for a growing
debtor country.With growth, the
debt—GNP ratio ofthe country canbe
stabilized even Ifthe country does
not pay the fullinterest burden,but only
the Interestburden netof the growth rateof the economy.For an economy
growing in dollarterms at 5 percentperyear, theannual net Interestburden
is reducedtoperhaps 2—4 percentof GW', with the countryborrowing
approximately 2 percentof &NP in newloans eachyear.
While calculationssuch as theseoversimplify theproblemsfacing the
debtorcountr4es, they dohighlight the
potential for along—term successful
resolution of thecrisis.5 As viewedfront theperspective
of the creditor
governments andthe IMP, the problem




collapse In thedebtor countries,and
without a breakdownin debtor-creditor
relations. In thisregard, the




it was wellunderstood that
international loanagreements are
difficult to enforce,so thatofficial
pressures
would be neededin order to keep
countries from repudiatingtheir
debts. Second,
if left on their own,theprivate
international lenders
would
tend to withdrawtoo abruptly
from the debtor
countries, to thedetriment of
both the borrowers








market, could arrange,panicked withdrawal of bank deposits can cause a healthy bank to fall victim
to a run (see Sachs 1984 for a more formal discussion of this point). This
kind of behavior is well recognized in the context of domesticbankruptcy law
(especially in corporate reorganization), which stops individual creditors
from collecting on their claims, and thereby enforces collective
decisionmaking by the creditors. In this sense, the IMP pressure for
concerted lending played some of the role of the bankruptcy code ina
corporate reorganization.
The_possibilitythat banks might causea"run" an a enun+r"Iteê ____
—36—
Problem 2: The Overemphasis on the U.S. Money Center Banks
Just as four countries represent "the debtor nations" in the minds of
many policymakers, so too do nine U.S. banks representthe "world financial
system". The U.S. bank debt is concentrated not only among countries, but
also among banks, with the money—center banks holding the great bulk of the
bc claims. At the end of March 1986, for example, the nine top U.S. banks
held 65 percent of the LDC debt held by all U.S. banks, although the
money-center banks accounted for only 40 percent of U.S.bank capital. The
money—center bank exposure In Latin America was 119.7 percentof capital,
while for the rest of U.S. banks, the exposure was only 43 percentof bank
capital. Thus, the risks to the U.S. banking systemfrom the debt crisis can
be isolated among a handful of banks, a fact which is often not appreciatedin—37—
banks (and shortsighted) than comparable policies in other countries. The
banks can report high earnings and pay large dividends on the basis of their
LDC exposure even though future debt servicing Is In question. The U.S.
taxpayers thereby bear much of LDC risk (via potential claims on the FDIC in
the event of bank failures) while the banks continue to make dividend
payments. In other countries, the regulatory treatment of the debt seems to
be much more realistic. In Canada, for example, there have been forced
partial writedowns for 32 developing countries. In Europe. writedowns of debt
are encouraged by a system of hidden reserveswhich aregiven favorable tax
treatment. By all reports, which admittedly are difficult to verify in view
of the lack of published European data, the European banks have written off
far more of their LDC debts than have the U.S. banks, and are therefore in a
stronger position to handle any new shocks or any program of debt relief.
The U.S. money center banks have sought, and obtained, by far the
greatest Influence of the international commercial banks in designing banking
policy vis-a—vis the problem debtor countries. The policy influence is felt
most directly in the bank steering committees that negotiate with the debtor
countries. As shown in Table 10, U.S. money center banks chair the bank
negotiating committees for all of the largest debtor countries, including
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the Philippines (Bank of Tokyo co-chair),
and Venezuela (Lloyds Bank co—chair), and the U.S. banks have a plurality of
votes in the case of every debtor country shown In the table except for Cuba,
Madagascar, Morocco, Poland, and Rumania. No doubt the European and Japanese
banks find the hardline position of the U.S. banks a convenient one, since It
has produced years of complete debt servicing by the largest debtors. But itTable 10
Composition of Bank Advisory Committees
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ableto absorb a debt strategy that is more generous to the debtor countries.
One of the ironies of the current situation is that while the U.S. banks
have vociferously opposed greater writedowns of L.DC debt, and all plans
-
involvingdebt forgiveness, the market value of these banks has already
declined in anticipation of future debt writeoffs.The stock market puts a
value on the commercial banks according to the values of the underlying assets
and liabilities of those banks. Not surprisingly, the market appears to value
the banks' claims on the problem debtor countries at much less than the face
value of those claims, as seen by a decline in bank stock prices relative to
the book values of the banks (see Kyle and Sachs (1984)). Evidence of
depressed stock prices is fully consistent with the discounts on LDC debt that
trade among the banks In a secondary market. Recent quotations (Salomon









Thus, In a sense, a market writedown of LDC claims has already occurred.
However, the debtor countries have enjoyed no benefit from this writedown
(since it has not been matched by actual debt forgiveness), and the regulators
have not forced the banks to bring reported earnings and dividends into line
with these more realistic asset values.—39-
Problem 3:The Instability of New Private Lending
The bargain between debtors and creditors since 1982 has been clear: the
debtor countries are to continue servicing the Interest on their bank, debts In
return for a postponement of principal repayments, easy terms on official
credits (both old and new), and new concerted lending from the commercial
banks. The third leg of this strategy has been shaky in the past two years,
despite the stated support for new lending from the U.S. government, In the
context of the Baker Plan.
Three things have happened. First, for reasons described earlier, the
-U.S.regional banks have been able to avoid their pro rata share of new
lending, as have many European and Japanese banks. The burden of new debt
servicing has (predictably) been left to those banks that are already most
deeply exposed, since the lesser exposed banks are able to free ride. Second,
the willingness of the large U.S. banks to engage In concerted lending has
also waned. As was shown In Table 6, the amounts of money provided in
concerted lending declined in 1985 and 1986 relatIve to the two previous
years. In 1986, concerted lending' rebounded somewhat over 1985, but only
because of loans to a single country, Mexico, and only after a bitter fight
between the banks and the U.S. Treasury (a battle not yet completely over at
the time of writing this paper). Third, while the concerted lending has
provided some new money to the public sectors of the debtor countries, the
private sectors have been net debt repayers, so that the banks are reducing
their total exposures in the debtor countries even while their loans
outstanding to the debtor country governments are rising.
The result is an enormous breach between rhetoric and reality. During—40-
the year since the Baker Plan was unveiled, banking exposure has declined
sharply. A recent report of the 11W contained the stunning news that the in
the first half of 19B6, the developing countries repaid $7.1 billion (in
addition to making interest payments!), in contrast to a net borrowing of $9
billion in 1985, $15 billion in 1984, and $35 billion in 1983. (IMF Survey,
12/15/86) Among the 15 countries singled out by Baker for special attention
under the Baker Plan, bank exposure fell by $3.4 billion. Data showing the
decline in bank lending, by region of LDC borrower, is shown in Table 11.
The 1986 bank settlement with Mexico, which included $6 billion of new
financing for Mexico over an 18 month period, might be seen as revitalizing
the process of concerted lending, but It Is just as likely to cause a backlash
against concerted lending, since •any of the banks deeply resented the
pressures to lend more to a collapsing Mexican economy, in which Inflation was
surging above 100 percent per year. As evidence for this resistance,
countries such as the Philippines which followed Mexico in the "queue' for
bank rescheduling, hit a stone wall at the banks, who were particularly
fearful of making the Mexican program into a precedent for other countries.
Overall, the current method of involuntary lending is unsatisfactory for
two reasons. First, the amounts involved appear to be Insufficient to finance
renewedgrowth In most of the debtor countries. Second, the amounts are
unstableyear to year. Whenever an economy looks like It can survive a year
without new funds, the banks vociferously resist new lending. The lending
resumes only in the context of a renewed balance of payments crisis. This
kind of on—again, off—again lending greatly discourages Investments In the
debtor countries, sin'e Investors recognize that the debtor country will be
prone to balance of payments crisis for the foreseeable future.Table 11





Developing countries 15.0 9.1 —7.1
Africa —0.3 1.4 —1.2
Asia 8.2 6.9 —1.3




Western Hemisphere s.o —0.1 —4.1
15 Heavily Indebted Countries 5.4 —1.9 —3.4
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets, December
1986, Table 7, p. 46.—41—
Problem 4: Macroeconomic Oversimplifications in Conditionality
Even under the best of circumstances, the return of a debtor country from
the financial brink Is difficult. Lenders and investors are wary of an
economy until a new and successful track record is established. New
industries •ust be developed to replace the declining sectors that were
previously fed by domestic demand, or that have suffered from the collapse of
International commodities prices. These difficulties usually require
significant time and luck (a resource discovery, a terms of trade improvement,
a rise In foreign demand), and can come unhinged from domestic political
unrest that follows in the wake of economic austerity. Moreover, the growth
of new sectors often requires substantial public sector investment to provide
the infrastructure (e.g. roads, energy, irrigation, etc.) to make the new
industries viable.
One of the lesser recognized problems mentioned earlier is the fact that
the bulk of the external debt is heavily concentrated In the public sector, so
that the fiscal situation in .any debtor countries has retained devastated
even after the country's trade balance has improved. Thus, the debtor
economies have remained the victims of very high interest rates (when the
-
governmentdeficit is bond financed), very high inflation (when money
financed), orvery inadequate public sector investments (when expenditures are
cut to make room for debtservicing),or a combination of all of these
afflictions.Higher tax rev nues inmany of the debtor countries will be a
partof a realistic solution to the continuing fiscal crisis. Remarkably,
however, the U.S. has recently opposed tax increases in the debtor countries
as a •atter of supply-side principle, almost regardless of the realities in—42—
the countries themselves. It Is also true that, politically and economically,
raising tax revenues during a recession is very hard, especially since the
contractionary effects of a tax increase may intensify the recession.
The "official view" of the creditor Community (with the U.S.. the IMF,
and the World Bank In the lead) has simplified the macroeconomic picture by
arguing that drastic liberalization of tride and domestic markets will solve
theproblem of economic recovery. These pronouncements Ignore the problems
justraised and are also ahistorical. The great successes of liberalization,
such as in Japan or Korea, have been affairs over the course of decades, not
months. Rapid liberalizations, as In the Southern Cone at the end of the
1970$, have more often than not failed. Moreover, strong government
intervention in the Asian miracle economies of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan,
appears to have fostered, rather than hindered, economic growth.
Problem 5: Underemphaslzing the Creditor Country Responsibilities
The creditors have made much of the policy mistakes of the debtor
countries, and have stressed that recovery from the debt crisis will require a
change of behavior in those countries. This emphasis has some merit, we have
seen, since most of the debtor countries made serious policy mistakes in the
past decade. But the focus Is also seriously misleading, since it reduces the
much-needed scrutiny of the behavior of creditor countries as well. As noted
earlier, forty countries did not simultaneously fall into crisis because of a
virulent epidemic of bad behavior; rather, the shocks of macroeconomic
policies of the creditor governments also played a key role. Similarly, the
worsening of the debtor situation since 1985 Is not a result of debtor country—43-
behavior,but rather the collapse of commodities prices, which is aglobal
macroeconomic phenomenon.
The leading governments have only recently begun to coordinate
macroeconomic policies in ways conducive to recovery from the debt crisis.
The Reagan Administration spent its first fiveyears denying any
responsibility for high world interest rates, and renouncing any intention of
coordinating macroeconomic policies. That Is beginning to change, though the
enormous U.S. fiscal deficit, which continues to hold world interest rates at
unusually high levels (to the debtor country detriment), is only fitfully
being brought under control.
Moreover, the U.S. and other creditor governments have successfully
divorceddiscussions about thedebt strategy fromdiscussions abouttheir own
tradepolicies.It is an elementary proposition that rising LDC exports area
key to a successful resolution of the debt crisis, and yet with increasing
frequency, trade actions by the U.S. and the Europeans work directly against
this imperative. As an example, the U.S. recently (1/2/87) cut the benefits
under the Generalized System of preferences for eight developingcountries,
including the debtor countries Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Yugoslavia.
Similarly, voluntary restraints on steel exports into the U.S. instituted in
1984 resulted in a restriction on steel exports frommany debtor countries,
most importantly Brazil and South Korea. in general, with worldwide trade in
agriculture, textiles, steel, and increasingly electronics, subject to
extensive protectionism and controls, it is extremely difficult and risky for
a debtor country toembark on anaggressive export push as a way to climb out
ofadebt crisis.—44—
Problem 6: The Failure of Diplomacy
The final problem that I shall raise is one of political style,rather
than economic substance: the diplomatic manner in whichthe debtor countries
have been dealt with in recent years, and the role of theseicountries in the
formulation of the debt management strategy. My point of referenceis the
Marshall Plan, which had as one of its major ambitions the developmentof
political, as well as economic, stability in Europeafter World War II. One
of the key aspects of the Marshall Plan was that the Europeannations were
required to work out a recovery plan on their own, andthen to submit that
plan to the U.S. for review and financing. Aftermuch debate, the Senate
rejected Imposing strict conditionality in the program, arguingthat it would
not be conducive to developing European support anddedication for their own
recovery program. In fact, the only specificcondition imposed in the program
was the establishment of a joint and continuous Europeanorganization to
oversee the recovery effort.6
In the case of the debt crisis, the developing countrieshave not been
treated with such dignity, but rather as if they needed constantscolding from
superior developed country brothers. This has been anextremely harmful
aspect of the recovery process, with muchtime spent on fights between the
debtor countries and the IMF, which has rather autocraticallyattempted to
i.pose Its views in stabilization programs.The bad will also spilled over
Into the Baker Plan, which dictates a radical free marketsolution as the
remedy for all of the debtor countries' problems.
This attitude of the creditor countries Is particularlyhard to
understand In view of the fact that the debt crisis arose In most casesin—45—
South America under autocratic
military dictatorships that have since been
replaced by legitimate and responsive democraticgovernments.Democracies
have replaced military dictatorships inArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,
Peru, and Uruguay, and in every one of thosecases, the debt problem emerged
under the previous military regime. InAsia, the same can be said about the
Philippines. Inotherwords, the mostimportant step towardsbetter
government has already been taken.
VI.SomeNew Stepsin Managingthe Debt Crisis
The earlier discussion in thispaper suggeststhatthe debt management
has leaned too far in the direction ofprotecting the commercial banks, and
not far enough In promoting economiägrowth in the debtor countries. Several
innovationsin debt•anagement couldbe effective in promoting debtorcountry
growth,seemingly without posing major risks to the financialsystem. Iwill
discussthree kinds of innovations,manyof which have been debated in policy
circlesin the past couple ofyears. First,it has been suggested thatfor
countries in the most extreme difficulties, thereis a case for providing
partial debt relief. The present value of thecountry's obligations would be
reducedthroughone of a number of mechanisms mentioned later.Second, for
most other debtor countries, theremay bea case for increasing and
stabilizing the inflowsofnew capital, particularly in view of the fact that
theconcerted lendingprocess seemstobe functioning poorly. Third, someof
therisks now facedby debtor countries could beshiftsonto the
internationai capital markets, to allow thedebtorgovernments a greater-46—
abilityto meettheuncertainties of interest rates, the terms of trade,
protectionism, and growth in the industrial countries.
These changes, which are discussed at greater length in a moment,could
be combined with other changes responsive to the problemsidentif led in the
previous section. Bank regulators might force a greatercapitalization of
U.S. banks, and sore writeoffs, to cushion theni against losses on[DC debts
in the future. International macroeconomic coordination couldfocus on the
tradeand interest rate linkages needed to overcome the crisis. Diplomacy
could enhance, rather than diminish, the stature of the new democraciesof
Latin America.
A.Partial end Selective Debt Relief
Twenty years ago, policymakers would have been much moreenthusiastic
about the case for selective debt forgiveness. In the generationafter World
War II, policymakers in the creditor governments knew thatthe failure to
grant timely relief on International debt had severelyweakenedU.S.allies in
the case of interallied war debts after World War I; hadcontributedto the
riseof Hitler in the case of German reparations; and hadcontributed to the
attractiveness of Peron's demagoguery in Argentina in the 1940sand 1950s.
These considerations led the creditor governments to grantdebt forgiveness to
Indonesia as recently as 1970.
Policymakers today fear debt relief because ofits potential impact on
the commercial banks. However, relief could be grantedselectively and
partially to a restricted group of debtor countries,in a way that would pose
only minimal risks to the internationalfinancial system. One proposal,-.47—
suggested in Sachs (1986). would grant relief according to a formula that
gives relief to the countries that have experienced the largest declines in
per capita income in recent years (other criteria could be applied, such as
granting relief only to the poorest countries, or those that have experienced
the greatest terms of trade shocks, etc.). In order to minimize moral hazard
problems, it is recommended that the relief be granted only as part of an
internationally supervised program of stabilization and reform.
In the specific Illustration in Sachs (1986), relief Is given In the form
of 5 years of complete forgiveness of Interest payments from debtor countries
that have suffered a drop in per capita GOP of 15 per cent or more since 1980.
In Latin America, this criterion Includes most of the debtor countries, but
Importantly excludes Brazil and Mexico, whose GDP decline has been less
severe. The suspension is to apply to all debts currently subject to
rescheduling by the commercial banks and by the official creditors In the
Paris Club. It turns out that the overall relief provided by U.S. banks to
five major Latin debtor countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuala) would total $6.6 billion In present value, and by all 815 banks,
19.1 billion. The forgiveness by U.S. banks would represent approximately
6.2% of bank capital. This 6.2% of bank capital Is much less than the market
writedowns of banks stocks that have already occurred!
How could relief by the banks actually be effectuated? One way would be
through moral suasion of the creditor governments and the IMP, or even through
legislation. A different and Interesting way, suggested by Kenen (1983) and
Hatori (1985), would be through the Intermediation of a financial Institution
(either an existing Institution such as the World Bank, or a new one created-48-
for this purpose). In the Kenen—Hatori plan, the international entity would
issue a bond that is guaranteed by participating crditor governments, and
would swap the bond with the commercial banks for their LOCclaims.The new
guaranteed bonds would have an Interest rate somewhat below the •arket rate,
and that lower rate would be passed along to the debtor countries. As in the
previous example, the reduction in interest rates could be tied to the extent
of deterioration of the debtor economy.
This plan has two key desirable feature. First, the banks would be
relinquishing a risky income stream with a positive spread over LIBOR for a
safe asset with a negative spread. The improvement in the quality of the
banks' portfolio would be enough to justify such a swap to bank shareholders,
who might otherwise object to a straightforward writedown of debt.
Shareholder objections would be moot, since it is clear that the market is
already heavily discounting the value of LOC assets in the secondary •arket.
Second, the plan would offer debt relief with no direct cost to the creditor
governments (or their taxpayers). It would be self financing, in the sense
that the commercial bank shareholders would effectively be supplying the
relief.
B. Increasing Net Capital Flows to the Debtor Countries
Many countries do not need explicit relief. Rather, they require
Increased and steadier inflows of public and private capital. The question
here is how to generate the increased and steadier inflows, in view of the
fact that the commercial banks are reducing, rather than Increasing their
exposures. Most proposals for vast amounts of new official lending are—49—
non-starters, particularly in this period of budget austerity in the major
industrial countries. There will have to be a continued reliance on private
market lending to provide the needed capital, and the key to such lending is
to •ake new private lending safer, in one way or another, then the existing
stock of debt. There are several ways to do this. One coemon suggestion is
for •ore cotinancingof projects betweentheWorld Bank and the private
sector, thereby allowing the private lenders to piggyback on the seniority of
World Bank loans (which by convention are never rescheduled). A related
methodwouldbe to strengthen the insurance system for international
investments (such as the MbA).
A different waythatleads to the sameoutcome,but without the need for
any new official money, is proposed in Sachs (1986). In the proposal, an
explicit agreement among the existing creditors would allow the debtor country
to borrow a predetermined level of new funds that would be earmarked as senior
to the existing debt. In other words, all creditors would agree that the
specified new debtwouldbe serviced in entirety before any of the existing
debtis serviced. The newlenders underthis arrangement would not have to be
banks. Senior lending could be made on the basis of marketable securities
purchased by asset funds, corporations, or private wealthholders. As with the
relief proposal, eligibility for seniority borrowing should be limited to
countries with poor economic performance, but not so poor as to trigger debt
relief. For example, eligibility might be given to countries that
have suffered a decline Inpercapita GDP during the 1980s.
The multilateralInstitutionswould have several functions in this
proposal.First, the IKE would reach an agrccacnt with the country on the—50-
amounts of incremental lending that will be raised on a senior basis.
Unlimited newborrowingwould not be allowed. Rather, the amount of senior
debt would be linked to growth targets in the debtor country, and the quality
of investment opportunities. The Fund would record and monitor the new senior
borrowing, and help to verify the senior treatment of the new debt. The World
Bank and the multilateral development banks would continue to play their
existing roles of defining and monitoring the investment programs of the
country, to support the effective utilization of the new borrowing.
The proposed arrangement would have the virtue that new capital could be
provided to the debtor countries without having to make a judgement about the
eventual fate of the existing debt. If the debtor country resumes Its growth,
both old and new debts will be serviced.If growth does not resume, the old
debts will be written off, which presumably would have happened anyway under
the current system of concerted lending. The proposal has both pluses and
minuses for the existing creditors. By agreeing to such a program, the banks
could suffer a reduction in value of their existing claims, but at the same
tl.e they would be freed from the obligation of involuntary lending, which now
puts the burden for new lending precisely on those banks whose portfolios are
already filled with the largest exposure in the debtor country. Additionally,
the value of the existing debt would be raised by this plan, not lowered, to
the extent that the new borrowing enhances the debt servicing capacity of the
country by more than the Interest cost of the new loans.
The amounts of new senior borrowing might represent S or 7 percent of the
existing stock of debt each year for the next few years. This level would
eliminate the net resource transfers currently made by the debtor countries to—51—
the creditors. At this rate, for example, Mexico would accumulate
approximately $35 billion of new senior debt over the next 5 years. an amount
that could readily be raised by new market borrowing, since $35 billion of
debt could be easily serviced by Mexico in the future, as long as that $35
billion is serviced before any of the existing $100 billion of Mexican debt.
C. Shifting Risks to the International Capital Markets
So far, the international capital markets have done little to diversify
the profound economic risks facing the debtor countries.Loan agreements
have few contingencies, for example, linking the level of repayments to the
state of the borrowing economy, its terms of trade, or any other indicators of
the borrowing country's economic wellbeing. Coodity linked bonds have never
gotten off the ground, for reasons that are not well understood by financial
specialists. Interest rate risk is borne entirely by the borrower, since
almost all debt is In the form of variable interest securities. The borrowers
also face the risks of credit cutoffs, with little possibility of obtaining
creditco.mitments for future borrowing.
It would seem that many of the risks facing the debtor countries could be
more efficiently diversified through more complex loan agreements. An initial
example is theMexicanaccord reached in 1986, which contained twoimportant
Innovations. First, there wasalink of newfinancing(and of 11SF performance
criteria) to thepriceof oil: a drop in the price of oil raised the level of
funds to bemade available to Mexico, and a drop did the reverse.In either
direction,the changein funding is gradually phasedoutover several
quarters,so that eventually Mexico has to adjust to, and not sily finance,—52-
the changes In Its terms of trade. The second special facility is a growth
contingency loan, which allows Mexico to draw on more official and private
funding for increased government spending if for any reason, Its growth does
not meet the program targets during a fixed period. Given the complexity of
the determinants of growth in the short term, negotiators felt that it was
Impossible to write an even more elaborate contract which linked the "growth"
lending to changes in underlying conditions, even though the agreed terms
suffer from the moral hazard problem that self—Inflicted growth slowdowns are
also rewarded by new lending.
There are several additional proposals that have been made in recent
years of a similar nature. Interest rate capping was widely discussed in
1984, before being dropped, but it remains a promising way for shielding the
debtor countries from some market risks. The debt—equity swap mechanism is
also partly a way to shed risks (and also partly a hidden mechanism for
partial debt forgiveness), by making the creditor take an equity position in
the debtor economy.Finally, the mechanism of linking debt servicing
payments to the level of exports, as unilaterally adopted by Peru in Its
ceiling of debt servicing to 10 percent of exports, or to GUlP (as proposed by
Feldstein (1986)), is yet another way for shedding some of the risks of debt
servicing. Brazil, in a more consensual manner, is adopting the Peruvian
position in Its current debt negotiations, by seeking to limit net resource
transfers to its creditors to 2.5 percent of GUlP. Such a rule would
automatically alter the amounts of debt servicing according to market interest
rates and according to GUlP growth In Brazil.—53—
VII. Conclusions
The •anagenient of the LDC debt crisis since 1982 has been an important
example of successful international policy coordination.At the time of the
outbreak of the Mexican debt crisis in the ster of 1982. many observers
feared that the crisis would provoke an international banking crisis, and a
global depression. Those fears have not come to pass, in large part because
of the active involvement of policymakers from the creditor countries, the
debtor countries, and the multilateral financial institutions.
The origins of the debt crisis can be found both in the shift in the
global macroeconomic environment in the early 1980s and in major policy
mistakesinmanydebtor countries. From a macroeconomic perspective, the
fundamentalchange In the global economy was the rise In interest rates to
levels exceeding the growth rate of exports of the debtor country. Once this
rise in interest rates occurred, the debt—export ratios of the debtor
countries could be stabilized only by a shift to trade balance surpluses in
the debtor countries, a shift which required deep and often painful
macroeconomic adjustments. Moreover, since most of the foreign borrowing had
been undertaken by the public sectors of the debtor countries, the shift in
interest rates also required sharp budget cuts in the public sector. For most
debtor countries, the long-term debt servicing prospects are not bleak, and it
Is realistic to expect over the long-term that needed adjustments to the trade
balance and the budgets can be made in most countries. These recent declines
in globalinterest rates greatly enhance the long-term prospects for a
successful resolution of thecrisis. Nonetheless, short—term difficulties—54—
could still easily derail a successful resolution of the crisis.
Policymakers recognized three distinct roles for public Intervention in
managing the debt crisis. First, public authorities recognized that the
marketplace itself could not provide adequate enforcement of the existing debt
contracts. A complete hands—off attitude of the public authorities would
likely have resulted in widespread defaults by the debtor governments, with
adverse consequences for all parties concerned. Second, the policynakers
recognized that if left by itself, the loan market would likely provide
insufficient levels of new funding for the debtor countries.There is an
inherent gap between the self—interest of individual banks, who want to pull
out willy-nilly from new lending, and the collective interest of all
creditors, that are best served by continuing to •ake new loans to the problem
debtor countries. Third, the policymakers recognized that there is a role for
the IMF to impose conditionality on debtor countries in return for new
lending, particularly in cases where misguided policies contributed to the
onset of the debt crisis.
The public role was conceived with these problems in mind. Led by the
U.S. government, the creditor governments coalesced around a strategy that
included: (1) pressure on the debtor countries to •aintaln debt servicing;
(2) pressure on the coetercial banks to continue lending, in "involuntary"
lending packages; and (3) IMF conditionality as the cornerstone of new lending
a9reements. To a significant extent, this package has forestalled widespread
defaults, and has prevented the worst fears of 1982 from coning to pass.
There continue to be serious problems, however, with the implementation
of this strategy. First, the pressure to maintain debt servicing payments has—55—
been carried to a point of absurdity, so that even countries inthemidst of
50,000 percent hyperinflatlons, or free falls of income,havebeenpressedto
maintain debt servicing. Second, the pressure on commercial banks to continue
lending has waxed and waned. Involuntary lending has proved to be too little
and toounstablea financial basis for economicrecoveryin most of the debtor
countries. Third, the contents of conditionality have been oversimplified,
with the IPIF and the World Bank pressing for mediate liberalization as the
key to recovery in the debtor countries, contrary to logic and historical
experience. This has led to a backlash from the debtor countries, that
strongly resist such simple and politically dangerous prescriptions.
Several recommendations were discussed in this paper as possible remedies
to these shortcomings. The recommendations revolved around three areas:
partial debt relief; stabilized capital Inflows; and a shifting of risks now
borne by th. debtor countries to the international capital markets. It was
suggested that partial debt relief would not have to pose profound risks for
the international system, and that such relief could be targeted to the
countries most in need. With respect to new capital inflows, a proposal for
new senior lending to the debtor countries was broached, with the aim of
stabilizing and Increasing the size of capital inflows into the debtor
countries. Finally, various proposals were discussed that aim at shifting
risks from the debtor countries to the international financial markets, such
as interest rate capping and commodity—linked lending.-56-
Footnotes
1.The top ten debtor countries in 1983 ranked by gross external debt to BIS
banks were Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Korea, Venezuela, Philippines,
Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Egypt. and Chile, of which Mexico, Venezuela,
Indonesia, and Egypt are oil exporters, and Argentina is approximately
self—sufficient. Oil exports exceed oil imports for this group of countries
as a whole.
2.A country that borrows the aoney it needs to make its debt service
payments will have its debt grow at the rate of Interest (e.g. with interest
rates at 10 percent, a country that borrows Its debt servicing bill will see
its total debt grow by 10 percent per year).As long as that interest rate
is equal to or less than the growth rate of export earnings, then the
debt—export ratio will be stable or falling.
3.See Dooley, M.P., "Country—specific Risk Premiums, Capital Flight and Net
Investment Income Payments in Selected Developing Countries, IMF Research
Department, DM186117, March 1986.
4.For a breakdown of the debt by creditor for different óroups of
borrowers, see IMF World Economic Outlook, Table A48, pp. 244—46.
5.The analytical oversimplifications tend to come in several places, as
.entioned later in the text. First, in order to service the country's debts,
GNP must be in an acceptable form, specifically, In the form of export
earnings. However, as economies shift from domestic production to exports,
measured GNP •ay well decline in the short run to intermediate run. Second,
since the debts are generally owed by the public sectors of the debtor—57.-
countries, debtor governments must raise taxes or cut spending in orderto
service the debts. Such fiscal actions will tend to exacerbate•any
•acroeconomic problems, such as unemployment and recession. Third,private
investors are likely to shun economies suffering from debtcrises, thus
undermining the economicgrowththat is counted upon to facilitate future debt
servicing.
6.SeeWexler,Imlianuel, TheMarshallPlan Revisited, Westport Connecticut:
GreenwoodPress,1983, pp. 48-49.—58—
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